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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The district court’s jurisdiction arose under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346.  The
court entered final judgment on November 30, 2010.  Plaintiffs filed a notice of
appeal on December 1, 2010.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.  Whether the district court correctly held that the minimum coverage
provision and the employer responsibility provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”) are valid exercises of Congress’s
commerce power.   
2.  Whether these provisions are also independently authorized by Congress’s
taxing power.
3.  Whether the district court correctly rejected plaintiffs’ religion-based
objections to the minimum coverage provision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.  The Affordable Care Act is a comprehensive reform of our national health
care system.  The Act seeks to ameliorate the longstanding crisis in the interstate
market for health care services that accounts for more than 17% of the nation’s gross
domestic product.  In enacting the law, Congress found that private health insurance
spending was projected to be approximately $854 billion in 2009, and “pays for
medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are shipped in interstate commerce. 
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Since most health insurance is sold by national or regional health insurance
companies, health insurance is sold in interstate commerce and claims payments flow
through interstate commerce.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B).
Increasing numbers of people without health insurance have consumed health
care services for which they do not pay.  These uncompensated costs — totaling
$43 billion in 2008 — are shifted to health care providers that are regularly engaged
in interstate commerce.  Providers pass on a significant portion of these costs to
private insurance companies, which also operate interstate.  The result is higher
premiums which, in turn, make insurance unaffordable to even greater numbers of
people.  At the same time, insurance companies use restrictive underwriting practices
to deny coverage or charge unaffordable premiums to millions across the nation
because they have pre-existing medical conditions.
The Affordable Care Act addresses these national and interstate problems,
which individual states are unable to handle comprehensively, through a series of
measures that will make affordable health care coverage widely available, protect
consumers from restrictive insurance industry underwriting practices, and reduce the
uncompensated costs of medical care obtained by the uninsured, which are otherwise
borne by others in the health care market.  
2.  Plaintiffs are two individuals and Liberty University.  They challenge the
2
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constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision of the Affordable Care Act,
which requires non-exempted individuals to maintain a minimum level of health
insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.  They also challenge
the provision of the Act that imposes a tax assessment on large employers that fail to
make adequate coverage available to their full-time employees when at least one of
their full-time employees receives a tax credit to assist with the purchase of coverage
in a health insurance exchange.  Id. § 4980H.
The individual plaintiffs do not have health insurance.  They acknowledge that
they have received and will need health care, but declare that they have made the
economic calculation to pay for such services out-of-pocket as they use them.  See
Joint Appendix (“JA”) 19 ¶ 34; JA 20 ¶ 38.  Plaintiffs contend that the minimum
coverage and employer responsibility provisions exceed Congress’s Article I powers. 
They also argue that the minimum coverage provision violates their rights under the
religion clauses of the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).
The district court rejected these claims.  It upheld the minimum coverage
provision and the employer responsibility provision as valid exercises of Congress’s
commerce power.  It rejected the premise of plaintiffs’ challenge to the minimum
coverage provision – that the provision regulates “inactivity, or ‘simply existing.’” 
3
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JA 166.  Noting the extensive congressional findings regarding the interstate market
for health care services and the effect on that market of individual attempts to pay for
services without insurance, the court concluded that the conduct regulated by the
minimum coverage provision “is economic in nature.”  JA 170.  “Nearly everyone
will require health care services at some point in their lifetimes, and it is not always
possible to predict when one will be afflicted by illness or injury and require care.” 
Ibid.  “Regardless of whether one relies on an insurance policy, one’s savings, or the
backstop of free or reduced-cost emergency room services, one has made a choice
regarding the method of payment for the health care services one expects to receive.” 
Ibid.  “As Congress found, the total incidence of these economic decisions has a
substantial impact on the national market for health care by collectively shifting
billions of dollars on to other market participants and driving up the prices of
insurance policies.”  JA 170-71.  
The court explained that the minimum coverage provision is also instrumental
to other reforms in the Affordable Care Act that bar insurance companies from
denying coverage because of pre-existing medical conditions (a requirement known
as “guaranteed issue”) and from charging higher premiums based on a person’s
medical history (a requirement known as “community rating”).  JA 172.  “As
Congress stated in its findings, the individual coverage provision is ‘essential’ to this
4
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larger regulatory scheme because without it, individuals would postpone health
insurance until they need substantial care, at which point the Act would obligate
insurers to cover them at the same cost as everyone else.”  Ibid.  “This would increase
the cost of health insurance and decrease the number of insured individuals —
precisely the harms that Congress sought to address with the Act’s regulatory
measures.”  Ibid.
Turning to the employer responsibility provision, the court emphasized that “it
is well-established in Supreme Court precedent that Congress has the power to
regulate the terms and conditions of employment.”  JA 173.  The court held that
Congress had a rational basis to conclude that “the terms of health coverage offered
by employers to their employees have substantial effects cumulatively on interstate
commerce.”  JA 174.
The court also rejected plaintiffs’ religion-based challenges, JA 177-90, and
entered judgment for the government.1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the Affordable Care Act, Congress made detailed findings addressed to the
standards that have been established by the Supreme Court for assessing whether
  The government does not challenge the district court’s threshold1
determinations on standing, ripeness, and the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act. 
5
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Congress has acted within its Commerce Clause power.  Congress found that the Act’s
minimum coverage requirement regulates “economic and financial decisions about
how and when health care is paid for,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A); that health
insurance “is sold in interstate commerce and claims payments flow through interstate
commerce,” id. § 18091(a)(2)(B); that the consumption of health care without
insurance has substantial adverse effects on the interstate health care market, id.
§ 18091(a)(2)(F); and that the minimum coverage requirement is “essential” to the
Act’s insurance reforms that prevent insurers from denying coverage or charging
higher premiums because of an individual’s medical condition or history, id.
§ 18091(a)(2)(I).
I. Background
A. The interstate market for health care services differs 
 from other markets in critical respects.
In responding to the crisis in the interstate health care market, Congress
confronted a market that is different in critical respects from any other.  Spending in
the interstate health care market is extraordinary, accounting for 17.6% of the nation’s
gross domestic product in 2009.  Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”),
National Health Expenditure 2009 Highlights, at 1 (2011).  Participation is essentially
universal; an individual’s need for expensive medical care is unpredictable; and,
6
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across the nation, emergency care is routinely provided without regard to an
individual’s ability to pay.  The market is also unique in that individuals typically pay
for health care services through private or government insurance.
Although most people obtain health care services on an ongoing basis, they
cannot accurately predict their future need for such services.  “Most medical expenses
for people under 65” result “from the bolt-from-the-blue event of an accident, a stroke,
or a complication of pregnancy that we know will happen on average but whose victim
we cannot (and they cannot) predict well in advance.”  Expanding Consumer Choice
and Addressing “Adverse Selection” Concerns in Health Insurance, Hearing Before
the Joint Economic Comm. 32 (2004) (Prof. Pauly).  Costs mount rapidly for treatment
of even the most common significant health problems.  For example, the average cost
of an appendectomy in 2010 was $13,123.  International Federation of Health Plans,
2010 Comparative Price Report: Medical and Hospital Fees By Country, at 14.  The
average cost of a day in the hospital was $3,612; of a hospital stay, $14,427; of a
Caesarian-section, $13,016; of bypass surgery, $59,770; of an angioplasty, $29,055. 
Id. at 9, 10, 12, 16,  17.  Drug treatment for a common form of cancer costs more than
$150,000 a year.  Meropol et al., Cost of Cancer Care: Issues and Implications, 25 J.
Clin. Oncol. 180, 182 (2007).  Thus, although the potential for financially ruinous
burdens is plain, what actually will happen — the “frequency, timing, and magnitude”
7
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of an individual’s demand for health care services — is unknowable.  Ruger, The
Moral Foundations of Health Insurance, 100 Q.J. Med. 53, 54-55 (2007).
Another distinction between the interstate health care market and other markets
is that many individuals receive, and expect to receive, costly health care services in
times of need without regard to their ability to pay.  For 25 years, the federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”) has required
hospitals that participate in Medicare and offer emergency services to stabilize any
patient who arrives with an emergency condition, regardless of whether the person has
insurance or otherwise can pay.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  Even before enactment of
EMTALA, many state legislatures and courts had recognized that hospitals cannot
properly turn away people in need of emergency treatment.  
B. Insurance is the principal means used to pay for health care services,
and the federal government’s involvement in this system of health
care financing is pervasive.
Reflecting the special characteristics of the national health care market, payment
for health care services is usually made through insurance.  In 2009, payments by
private health insurers constituted 32% of the $2.5 trillion in national health care
spending.  CMS, 2009 National Health Expenditure Data, table 3 (2011). 
Employment-based insurance plans accounted for most private coverage; about 59%
of the non-elderly U.S. population (156.2 million people) had employer-based health
8
Case: 10-2347     Document: 34      Date Filed: 02/18/2011      Page: 21
insurance in 2009.  Holahan, The 2007-09 Recession And Health Insurance Coverage,
30 Health Affairs 145, 148 (2011).  In that year, about 5.2% of the non-elderly
population (13.8 million people) had policies purchased in the individual insurance
market.  Ibid.
In 2009, more than 43% of health care spending was financed by federal, state,
and local governments.  CMS, 2009 National Health Expenditure Data, tables 5 & 11. 
The federal government provides health insurance for older and disabled Americans
under Medicare, accounting for 20% of national health care spending in 2009.  Id.,
table 11.  Federal and state governments provide health insurance for low-income
Americans through Medicaid, which constituted an additional 15% of national health
care spending in 2009.  Ibid.  Another 12% of health care spending reflected
government spending on benefits for veterans and their dependents; workers’
compensation; and the Children’s Health Insurance Program for limited-income
children.  Id., table 5.
As these figures indicate, the federal government’s involvement in the system
of health care financing is pervasive.  In 2009, federal spending on Medicare and
Medicaid was around $750 billion; billions more went to other federal programs, such
as programs for veterans.  Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), The Long-Term
Budget Outlook, at 30 (2010).  These figures do not include the federal government’s
9
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longstanding use of tax incentives to finance health care costs.  CBO, Key Issues In
Analyzing Major Health Proposals, at 30 (2008) (“Key Issues”).2
C. People who endeavor to pay for health care services through means
other than insurance, as a class, shift significant economic costs to
other participants in the interstate health care market.
An estimated 18.8% of the non-elderly population (approximately 50 million
people) had no health insurance in 2009.  Census Bureau Report, Income, Poverty, and
Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2009, at 23, table 8.  People without
insurance are active participants in the interstate health care market, consuming over
$100 billion of health care services annually.  Families USA, Hidden Health Tax:
Americans Pay a Premium, at 2 (2009) ($116 billion in 2008); see also, e.g., CDC,
National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 2009, at 318 table 80
(2010) (80% of those without insurance at some point during a 12-month period made
at least one visit to a doctor or emergency room); CDC, National Center for Health
Statistics, Emergency Department Visitors and Visits: Who Used the Emergency
Room in 2007?, at 2 (2010) (20% of uninsured adults aged 18-44 visited the
emergency room at least once in 2007); CDC, National Center for Health Statistics,
Summary Health Statistics Health Statistics for U.S. Children: National Health
 The federal government is involved in other aspects of health care, including2
the regulation of drugs and medical devices, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 351, and dealing with
diseases that cross state boundaries.  42 U.S.C. § 264(b) (federal quarantine statute).
10
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Interview Survey, 2009, table 16 (2010) (18% of uninsured children visited the
emergency room at least once in 2009).
People without insurance, as a group, do not pay the full cost of the services
they obtain and “receive treatments from traditional providers for which they either
do not pay or pay very little.”  CBO, Key Issues, at 13.  Congress found that, in 2008,
the cost of providing uncompensated health care to the uninsured — i.e., care not paid
for by the patient or a third party — was $43 billion.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F);
see also Families USA, Hidden Health Tax at 2, 6.  Congress further found that health
care providers pass on a significant portion of these costs “to private insurers, which
pass on the cost to families,” increasing the average premiums paid by families who
carry insurance by “over $1,000 a year.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F); see also
Families USA, Hidden Health Tax at 2, 6.
D.  Before passage of the Affordable Care Act, the percentage
of non-elderly people in the United States with private
health insurance steadily decreased due to rising
premiums and barriers to obtaining coverage.
In 2009, the percentage of the non-elderly with private health insurance
coverage (64.2%) was significantly lower than in 2000 (73.4%), meaning that millions
more Americans lacked insurance.  Holahan, The 2007-09 Recession And Health
Insurance Coverage, 30 Health Affairs 145, 148 (2011).  The percentage covered by
11
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employment-based plans, traditionally the largest source of private health insurance,
declined from 68.3% in 2000 to 59% in 2009.  Ibid.
People who attempt to purchase health insurance in the individual insurance
market face significant obstacles.  Insurers scrutinize the medical condition and history
of applicants to determine eligibility and premiums, a process known as “medical
underwriting.”  CBO, Key Issues at 8, 80.  A recent national survey estimated that 12.6
million non-elderly adults — 36% of those who tried to purchase health insurance in
the previous three years in the individual insurance market — were denied coverage,
charged a higher rate, or offered limited coverage because of a pre-existing condition. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), Coverage Denied: How the
Current Health Insurance System Leaves Millions Behind (2009). 
Medical underwriting is expensive, and insurers pass on that expense through
increased premiums in the individual market.  Administrative costs for private health
insurance, including underwriting costs, totaled $90 billion in 2006 – 26-30% of the
premiums in the individual and small group markets.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(J).
Given the cost of policies and restrictions on coverage, only 20% of Americans
who lack other coverage options purchase a policy in the individual market.  CBO,
Key Issues at 9.  The remaining 80% are uninsured.  Ibid.
12
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II.  The Affordable Care Act
The Affordable Care Act addressed the problems in the national health care
system, which states are unable to solve individually.  Through a series of measures,
the Act will make health care coverage widely available and affordable, protect
consumers from insurance industry underwriting practices, and reduce the
uncompensated care that shifts costs to other participants in the interstate health care
market and increases the premiums paid by insured consumers.  In so doing, the Act
removes obstacles to interstate commerce, such as the reluctance of workers to take
new jobs for fear of becoming unable to obtain affordable insurance. 
First, the Act builds upon the existing nationwide system of employer-based
health insurance that is the principal private mechanism for health care financing. 
Congress established tax incentives for small businesses to purchase health insurance
for their employees.  26 U.S.C.A. § 45R.  And, in the employer responsibility
provision at issue here, Congress prescribed tax penalties for a large employer if it
does not offer full-time employees adequate coverage, and at least one full-time
employee receives a tax credit to assist with the purchase of coverage in a health
insurance exchange established under the Act.  Id. § 4980H. 
Second, the Act creates health insurance exchanges to allow individuals,
families, and small businesses to use the leverage of collective buying power to obtain
13
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prices and benefits competitive with those of typical employer group plans.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18031. 
Third, for eligible individuals and families with household income between
133% and 400% of the federal poverty line who purchase coverage through an
exchange, Congress created federal tax credits for payment of health insurance
premiums.  26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a)-(c).  Congress also created cost-sharing reductions
to help cover out-of-pocket expenses such as copayments or deductibles for eligible
individuals who receive coverage in an exchange.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18081.  Congress
also expanded eligibility for Medicaid to all individuals with income below 133% of
the federal poverty line.  Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
Fourth, the Act imposes new regulations on insurance companies to protect
individuals from industry practices that have prevented people from obtaining and
keeping health insurance.  The Act bars insurance companies from refusing coverage
because of pre-existing medical conditions, canceling insurance absent fraud or
intentional misrepresentation of material fact, charging higher premiums based on a
person’s medical history, and placing lifetime caps on benefits the policyholder can
receive.  Id. § 300gg-1(a), -3(a), -11, -12.
Fifth, in the minimum coverage provision at issue here, the Act requires that
non-exempted individuals pay a tax penalty if they do not maintain a minimum level
14
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of health insurance.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.   The penalty does not apply to individuals3
with insufficient household income to be required to file a federal tax return, whose
share of premium payments exceeds 8% of their household income, or who establish
that the requirement imposes a hardship.  Id. § 5000A(e).
Congress exempted members of “health care sharing ministries” who do not
participate in the general health care market, id. § 5000A(d)(2)(B), as well as
adherents of religious sects that are “conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the
benefits of any private or public insurance,” provided the sect makes “provision for
their dependent members” and meets other requirements, id. § 5000A(d)(2)(A).
  The CBO projected that the Act would reduce the number of non-elderly people
without insurance by about 32 million by 2019.  Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf,
Director, CBO, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, at 9 (Mar.
20, 2010).
 This insurance requirement may be satisfied through enrollment in an3
employer-sponsored insurance plan; an individual market plan including a plan
offered through a health insurance exchange; a grandfathered health plan; a
government-sponsored program, such as Medicare, Medicaid, or TRICARE; or
similar coverage recognized by the Secretary of HHS in coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(f).
15
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Affordable Care Act as a whole, and the minimum coverage and employer
responsibility provisions in particular, regulate the diverse methods by which
consumers pay for health care services in the massive interstate health care market. 
The Act reflects the considered effort of the elected branches of government — based
on months of debate, weeks of hearings, and detailed empirical studies — to stem a
crisis in the health care market that has threatened the vitality of the U.S. economy.
I.  A.  The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate conduct that
substantially affects interstate commerce.  As Congress found, payment for services
in the interstate health care market is economic activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce.  The requirement that participants in the health care market have
insurance to pay for the services they consume is thus a quintessential exercise of the
commerce power.  The regulation furthers two principal economic goals.  First, it
prevents the substantial cost-shifting in the interstate health care services market that
results from the practice of consuming health care without insurance.  Second, it is key
to the viability of the Act’s requirement that insurers cannot deny coverage or charge
higher premiums because of an individual’s medical condition or history.
Fundamental features of the legislation and the health care market are in
dispute.  Health care providers and insurers operate interstate.  Virtually all
16
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Americans, including the individual plaintiffs, participate in the health care market. 
The need for expensive health care services is unpredictable, and people who endeavor
to pay for such services without insurance do not, as a class, pay the full cost of the
services they obtain.
The federal government, along with state governments, shoulders some of these
costs.  Health care providers pass much of the remainder on to private insurers, which
pass it on to their customers.  Rising premiums contribute in turn to the decline in the
population covered by private insurance.  Completing the cycle, the growing
percentage of people without health insurance further inflates premiums.  
The Affordable Care Act seeks to break this cycle by requiring consumers to
maintain a minimum level of insurance to meet health care costs.  The Act also
restricts the medical underwriting practices that have precluded many Americans from
obtaining affordable insurance because of pre-existing medical conditions.  The statute
thus makes persons such as the individual plaintiffs legally insurable regardless of
past, present, or future illness or injury, and protects them from higher premiums based
on medical condition or history.  The experience of state insurance regulators
demonstrated that such a system of guaranteed issue and community rating is
unworkable if health care consumers can postpone the purchase of insurance until
their medical costs outstrip their insurance premiums.
17
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In sum, the minimum coverage provision is within the commerce power because
it is a wholly rational means of regulating payment for health care services by
participants in the health care market, of preventing consumers from shifting costs to
other market participants, and of effectuating the requirements of  guaranteed coverage
and community rating.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17, 22 (2005).  
B.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that courts must accord great
deference to the regulatory means Congress selects to accomplish its legitimate
regulatory objectives, a deference that reflects the constitutional authority and
institutional capacity of the political branches to make such operational choices.  Thus,
Congress’s power can even extend to regulation of an “intrastate activity” or even
“noneconomic local activity” — “the relevant question is simply whether the means
chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the
commerce power.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
That standard echoes the principles set forth by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819): “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.”
The end that Congress seeks to address is undoubtedly legitimate because
18
Case: 10-2347     Document: 34      Date Filed: 02/18/2011      Page: 31
consumption of health care services without insurance has demonstrable and harmful
effects on other participants in the interstate health care market.  The means that
Congress adopted are proper and are adapted to the unique conditions of the national
market for health care services.  Participation in the market is nearly universal, and,
in contrast to other markets with widespread participation, consumers cannot predict
the timing and the extent of their need for expensive health care services.  When that
need arises, individuals depend on the extensive medical infrastructure financed and
sustained by other participants in the health care services market to provide services. 
The cost of those services can easily exceed the consumer’s ability to pay and, unlike
in other markets, consumers can and do receive expensive forms of medical treatment
in times of need for which they do not pay.  Congress had far more than a rational
basis to conclude that consumption of health care services without insurance
substantially affects interstate commerce, and that a minimum coverage requirement
will restrict the shifting of costs to other market participants and be instrumental in
effectuating a comprehensive regulatory scheme.  
C.  The individual plaintiffs acknowledge that they participate in the market for
health care services.  They argue, however, that because they have not purchased
insurance, the minimum coverage provision regulates their “inactivity in commerce,”
which they describe as “a decision not to purchase health insurance and to otherwise
19
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privately manage” their health care.  Pl. Br. 1.  
This argument misconceives the nature of the regulated market as well as the
governing Commerce Clause principles.  Persons who attempt to pay for health care
services out-of-pocket are no more “inactiv[e] in commerce” than persons who pay
with insurance.  The requirement to maintain insurance is inextricably bound up with
the regulation of the health care market, of which health insurance is an integral
component.  Plaintiffs’ effort to divorce their active participation in the health care
market from their means of payment for services in that market disregards the
teachings of the Supreme Court, which has rejected such artificial distinctions in favor
of  “broad principles of economic practicality.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
568-75 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
The decisions that plaintiffs invoke were concerned with preserving “a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”  United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-618 (2000) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-568).  But
plaintiffs do not and could not suggest that regulation of the interstate health care
market and the health insurance market — which have long been subject to federal
regulation — intrudes upon a domain reserved exclusively to the states.  The modern
health care system operates across state boundaries.  Most health insurance is sold or
administered by national or regional companies that operate interstate, and pays for
20
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medical supplies shipped in interstate commerce.   Further, “hospitals are regularly
engaged in interstate commerce, performing services for out of state patients and
generating revenues from out of state sources.”  Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health,
Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2002).  Unlike the statutes in Lopez and Morrison,
the Affordable Care Act regulates interstate activity that is truly national and
inherently economic.  Moreover, the Act addresses concerns that states may have
difficulty addressing individually.  Unless medical underwriting is regulated on a
national basis, for example, the prospect of losing employee insurance benefits may
trap individuals in their current job and state, obstructing the very mobility that the
commerce power was designed to protect.
At bottom, plaintiffs’ rhetoric does not concern the limits of the Commerce
Clause, but rather the scope of governmental authority generally, whether state or
federal.  In the guise of a commerce power argument, they assert an infringement of
their freedom of contract.  Such economic due process claims, however, have not
succeeded since the Lochner-era and have no merit here.
II.  If the Court were to reach the issue, the minimum coverage and employer
responsibility provisions also may be upheld as valid exercises of Congress’s taxing
power.  In “passing on the constitutionality of a tax law,” a court is “concerned only
with its practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words
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which may be applied to it.”  Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363
(1941).  The provisions appear in the Internal Revenue Code and operate as taxes. 
They are projected to raise billions of dollars in revenue each year once fully in effect. 
The validity of the assessments does not turn on whether they are labeled as “taxes.” 
Indeed, the Constitution uses several different terms to refer to the concept of taxation.
III.  Plaintiffs’ religion-based objections are insubstantial for the reasons set out
by the district court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to
dismiss.  Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2007).  
ARGUMENT 
I. The Minimum Coverage Provision and Employer Responsibility Provision
Are Valid Exercises of Congress’s Commerce Power.
The Constitution grants Congress power to “regulate Commerce ... among the
several States,” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper” to the execution of that power, id. cl. 18.  This grant of
authority allows Congress to regulate not only interstate commerce but also to address
other conduct that “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at
16-17.  In assessing those substantial effects, Congress’s focus is necessarily broad. 
Congress may consider the aggregate effect of a particular form of conduct of those
22
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subject to the regulation, and need not predict case by case whether and to what extent
particular individuals in the class will contribute to those aggregate effects.  Id. at 22. 
In reviewing the validity of legislation enacted under the commerce power, a
court’s task “is a modest one.”  Ibid.  The court “need not determine” whether the
regulated conduct, “taken in the aggregate, substantially affect[s] interstate commerce
in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”  United States v.
Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 472 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 22).  A court is
similarly deferential in reviewing the means Congress chooses to achieve legitimate
ends.  “[T]he Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are
accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or
‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’” United States v. Comstock, 130
S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413, 418).  This deference
reflects both separation-of-powers principles and Congress’s superior capacity to
make empirical and operational judgments.  It “has special significance in cases, like
this one, involving congressional judgments concerning regulatory schemes of
inherent complexity.”  Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196
(1997).
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A. The minimum coverage provision regulates the means of payment
for health care services, a class of economic activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce. 
Congress’s findings and the legislative record leave no doubt that the minimum
coverage provision — which regulates the means of payment for services in the
interstate health care market — “regulates activity that is commercial and economic
in nature,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A), and that has an enormous impact on
interstate commerce.  First, the minimum coverage provision addresses the
consumption of health care services without payment, which is indisputably activity
that shifts billions of dollars of costs annually to other participants in the interstate
health care market and to the federal government and states.  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(F). 
These costs are spread across state lines because many insurance companies operate
in multiple states.  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(B).  Second, the provision is instrumental to the
viability of the statute’s regulation of medical underwriting, which guarantees persons
such as plaintiffs that they will be insurable regardless of illnesses or accidents, and
will not be charged higher premiums on account of health status or history.  Id.
§ 18091(a)(2)(I), (J).
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1. The minimum coverage provision regulates the practice of
obtaining health care services without insurance, a practice
that shifts significant health care costs to other participants in
the health care market.
The interstate nature of the market for health care services is not in dispute.  Nor
is it controverted that, as a class, Americans participate in the market for health care
services whether or not they have health insurance.  See pp.10-11, supra.  The
uninsured population does not, however, bear the full cost of this participation.  A
2005 study found that, even in households at or above median income, uninsured
people on average pay for less than half the cost of the medical care they consume. 
Herring, The Effect of the Availability of Charity Care to the Uninsured on the
Demand for Private Health Insurance, 24 J. Health Econ. 225, 229-30 (2005).
Congress made statutory findings that quantified this impact on interstate
commerce: “The cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured was
$43,000,000,000 in 2008.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F).  Congress also provided
further detail on how these costs affect the interstate health care market — costs are
passed on from providers “to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families.” 
Ibid.
Congress determined that this cost-shifting inflates premiums that families pay
for their health insurance “by an average of over $1,000 a year.”  Ibid.; see also 156
Cong. Rec. E506-01, 2010 WL 1133757 (Rep. Waxman) (Mar. 25, 2010).  In
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California, for example, an estimated 10% of health insurance premiums is attributable
to uncompensated care consumed by people without insurance.  S. Rep. No. 111-89,
at 2 (2009).
Supreme Court precedents make clear that it is irrelevant whether a particular
individual’s consumption of health care services without insurance will impose a
substantial burden on the interstate health care market, because it is the aggregate
impact that justifies the exercise of the commerce power.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19;
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942).  Nor does the commerce power require
a showing that every uninsured person will shift health care costs.  Millions will do
so each year, and the cumulative impact of such cost-shifting is a multi-billion dollar
annual burden on interstate commerce — a burden that easily qualifies as
“substantial.”  Congress is not required “to legislate with scientific exactitude,” Raich,
545 U.S. at 17, and does not have to predict, person-by-person, who among the
uninsured will receive medical services and fail to pay in a given year.  The Court has
repeatedly held that where “Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a
practice” — here, the practice of consuming health care services without insurance —
“poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Ibid. (quoting
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-155 (1971)); see also Gould, 568 F.3d at
474-75.
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2. The minimum coverage provision is essential to the Act’s
guaranteed issue and community rating insurance reforms.   
The minimum coverage provision is also valid Commerce Clause legislation
because it is an integral part of the broader statutory scheme, which requires that
insurers extend coverage and set premiums without regard to pre-existing medical
conditions.  These provisions thus make persons such as the individual plaintiffs
insurable even if they currently have, previously had, or will develop medical
conditions.  
Learning from the experience of state regulators, Congress recognized that an
effective system of guaranteed issue and community rating is unsustainable if
participants in the health care market can postpone purchasing insurance until an acute
need arises.  Accordingly, Congress concluded that the absence of a minimum
coverage requirement “would leave a gaping hole” in the regulatory scheme.  Raich,
545 U.S. at 22.  Thus, even if the means of payment for health care services were not
regarded as economic, it would nevertheless properly be regulated because Congress
found that the “failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation
of the interstate market.”  Id. at 18; see also id. at 37-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court
upheld employer record-keeping requirements for intrastate transactions as an
appropriate means to ensure compliance with its regulation of interstate commerce);
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Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 587 (4th Cir. 1997) (Congress could restrict efforts
to obstruct access to reproductive health care facilities because the regulated activity
“while not itself economic or commercial, is closely and directly connected with an
economic activity”).
The nation faces an acute shortage of affordable health insurance.  More than
50 million Americans went without insurance in 2009. Census Bureau Report, Income,
Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2009, at 23, table 8. 
Many of these people were priced out of the market by rising premiums.  Between
1999 and 2010, for example, average premiums for employer-sponsored family
coverage increased 138 percent.  Kaiser Family Foundation Employer Health Benefits,
2010 Annual Survey at 31, table 1.11 (2010). 
Many others are excluded as a result of a screening process known as “medical
underwriting,” in which coverage eligibility and premium levels are established based
on individual health status or history.  About 36% of non-elderly adult applicants in
the individual market are denied coverage, charged a substantially higher premium,
or offered limited coverage because of pre-existing conditions.  Coverage Denied,
supra, at 1.  Depending on the definition used, between 50 and 129 million
non-elderly Americans (or 19 to 50% of the non-elderly population) have at least one
pre-existing condition, and more than 600,000 individuals were excluded by the 
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the four largest for-profit insurers in the three years before the Affordable Care Act
was enacted.  HHS, At Risk: Pre-Existing Conditions Could Affect 1 in 2 Americans
(2011); Chairman Henry A. Waxman and Rep. Bart Stupak, Memorandum on
Coverage Denials for Pre-Existing Conditions in the Individual Health Insurance
Market to H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, at 1 (Oct. 12, 2010).
Insurers often deny coverage even for minor pre-existing conditions.  “In field
studies, market testers found that conditions as common as asthma, ear infections, and
high blood pressure can create problems obtaining coverage.”  47 Million and
Counting, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 52 (2008) (Prof.
Hall); see Consumer Choices and Transparency in the Health Insurance Industry, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 111th Cong. 29
(2009).  “The four largest for-profit health insurance companies ... have each listed
pregnancy as a medical condition that would result in an automatic denial of
individual health insurance coverage.”  Chairman Waxman and Rep. Stupak,
Memorandum on Maternity Coverage in the Individual Health Insurance Market to H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, at 1 (Oct. 12, 2010).
The Act addresses these restrictive underwriting practices by barring insurance
companies from denying coverage or setting premiums based on medical condition. 
Congress found that these guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements would
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not work without a minimum coverage provision to prevent health care consumers
from waiting to buy insurance until they are sick or injured.  42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(I).  A “health insurance market could never survive or even form if
people could buy their insurance on the way to the hospital.”  47 Million and
Counting, 110th Cong. 52 (Prof. Hall). Congress thus found the provision “essential
to creating effective health insurance markets that do not require underwriting and
eliminate its associated administrative costs.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(J).
The legislative record demonstrated that the absence of a minimum coverage
requirement linked to guaranteed-issue and community-rating measures had
undermined health care reform efforts in several states.  Making Health Care Work for
American Families, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
Subcomm. on Health, 111th Cong. 11 (Mar. 17, 2009) (Prof. Reinhardt).  Citing New
Jersey’s experience, Reinhardt explained that “[i]t is well known that community-
rating and guaranteed issue, coupled with voluntary insurance, tends to lead to a death
spiral of individual insurance.”  Ibid.; see also Monheit et al., Community Rating &
Sustainable Individual Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey, 23 Health Affairs
167, 168 (2004).  
In the wake of similar legislation in New York, “[t]here was a dramatic exodus
of indemnity insurers from New York’s individual market.”  Hall, An Evaluation of
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New York’s Reform Law, 25 J. Health Politics, Pol’y & Law 71, 91-92 (2000).  And
when Maine enacted similar legislation, most insurers withdrew from the state.  Health
Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms, Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 117 (2009) (Letter of Phil Caper, M.D., and Joe
Lendvai).
In contrast, Congress found that Massachusetts avoided these perils by enacting
a minimum coverage requirement as part of its broader insurance reforms.  That
requirement “has strengthened private employer-based coverage: despite the economic
downturn, the number of workers offered employer-based coverage has actually
increased.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(D).
The massive legislative record thus supports Congress’s finding that the
minimum coverage provision “is essential to creating effective health insurance
markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do
not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.”  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(I). 
Congress is plainly permitted to enact a provision so integral to its insurance reforms. 
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B. The minimum coverage provision is a necessary and
proper means of regulating interstate commerce. 
1. The courts accord broad deference to the means adopted by
Congress to advance legitimate regulatory goals.  
Plaintiffs do not dispute that people who obtain health care services without
insurance shift substantial costs to other market participants; nor do they dispute the
centrality of the minimum coverage provision to the Affordable Care Act’s broader
regulation of medical underwriting.  Plaintiffs instead challenge the means by which
Congress determined to regulate payment in the interstate market for health care
services.  Governing precedent leaves no room for plaintiffs’ invitation to override
Congress’s judgment about the appropriate means to achieve its legitimate objectives.
“[T]he Federal ‘[g]overnment is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers,’” but, “at the same time, ‘a government, entrusted with such’ powers ‘must
also be entrusted with ample means for their execution.’”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at
1956 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405, 408).  Justice Scalia invoked this time-
honored precept when he observed that the “regulation of an intrastate activity may
be essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though the
intrastate activity does not itself ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.”  Raich,
545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  “Moreover, as ... Lopez ...
suggests, Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is
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a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.”  Ibid. (citing
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).  Where “Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of
interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation
effective.’”  Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110,
118-19 (1942)).
Thus, “the relevant inquiry” under the Necessary and Proper Clause “is simply
‘whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legitimate
end under the commerce power’ or under other powers that the Constitution grants
Congress the authority to implement.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957 (quoting Raich,
545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at
121)).  Accordingly, “in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants
Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute,” the Court asks
“whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation
of a constitutionally enumerated power.”  Id. at 1956.
2. The minimum coverage requirement is plainly adapted to the
unique conditions of the market for health care services.
The means chosen by Congress to effectuate the Affordable Care Act’s
regulatory goals were dictated by, and tailored to, the unique features of the market for
health care services: participation is essentially universal; the need for medical
treatment may arise unexpectedly and not as a matter of choice; the cost of care may
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overwhelm the typical family budget; and, in many cases, an individual can expect to
receive expensive medical services without regard to his ability to pay. 
A government requirement to purchase insurance to avoid the externalization
of costs is hardly novel.  In the case of vehicle insurance, the requirement may
accompany registration of an automobile.  The risks addressed by health insurance,
however, are always present and are not linked to a particular circumstance such as car
ownership.  Moreover, our society has long recognized that some forms of medical
treatment are not privileges conditioned on compliance with regulations.  While it is
entirely acceptable for the government to make automobile insurance a condition for
use of the highways, it would be entirely unacceptable to impose a comparable
requirement on the use of an emergency room. 
Even before enactment of the EMTALA in 1986, state courts and legislatures
had responded to the changing role of private hospitals and of emergency rooms by
creating tort liability for the failure to provide emergency services.  The common law
had long recognized limitations on a physician’s ability to abandon treatment
regardless of patients’ ability to pay, but recognized no duty on the part of private
physicians to provide care in the first place.  Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (N.Y.
Sup. 1891).  The common law evolved, however, to preclude hospitals from turning
away patients with emergency needs because they are unable to pay for services. 
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Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court held in 1961 that “liability on the part of a hospital
may be predicated on the refusal of service to a patient in case of an unmistakable
emergency.”  Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del.
1961); see also Walling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 455 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990) (“modern rule” is “that liability on the part of a private hospital may be based
upon the refusal of service to a patient in a case of unmistakable medical emergency”). 
In addition to “state court rulings impos[ing] a common law duty on doctors and
hospitals to provide necessary emergency care,” by 1985, “at least 22 states [had]
enacted statutes or issued regulations requiring the provision of limited medical
services whenever an emergency situation exists[.]”  H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(III)
(1985), at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 727.
These measures were inadequate, however, to prevent “hospital emergency
rooms [from] refusing to treat patients with emergency conditions if the patient does
not have medical insurance.’”  H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(I), at 27 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605).  Congress thus enacted EMTALA “to address a
growing concern with preventing ‘patient dumping,’ the practice of refusing to provide
emergency medical treatment to patients unable to pay, or transferring them before
emergency conditions were stabilized.”  Vickers v. Nash General Hospital, 78 F.3d
139, 142 (4th Cir. 1996).  The federal statute augmented state law by requiring all
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hospitals that participate in Medicare and offer emergency services to stabilize any
patient who arrives with an emergency condition, without regard to ability to pay. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; see also Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999)
(per curiam).
The minimum coverage provision is adapted to these practical and moral
imperatives.  It is clearly “proper” for Congress to take into account both the practical
realities of the health insurance market and the societal judgment — reflected in the
common law as well as EMTALA — that it is unconscionable to deny medical care
to someone in an emergency because of the economic choices that she has made.  Cf.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1961 (noting “common law” requirements imposed on
custodians when holding it “necessary and proper” for Congress to confine a federal
prisoner whose mental illness threatens others).
3. Plaintiffs, like virtually all other Americans, participate in the
health care market whether or not they currently purchase
health insurance. 
a.  Plaintiffs’ Statement of Issues — “Whether Congress has authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate a private citizen’s inactivity in commerce (a decision not
to purchase health insurance and to otherwise privately manage her own healthcare)
and force said citizen to participate in commerce,” Pl. Br. 1 — underscores the
fundamental error in their position.  Plaintiffs are not “inactiv[e] in commerce.”  Like
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virtually all Americans, they participate in the commercial market for health care
services.  JA 19 ¶ 34 (alleging that Waddell “receives the health care services she
needs and desires and pays for them as she uses them”).  The minimum coverage
provision regulates how they pay for services in that market — activity that is itself
“commercial and economic in nature” and a subject of interstate commerce.  42
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A).
Plaintiffs’ contention that they are not market participants echoes arguments
rejected by the Supreme Court.  In Raich, the Court upheld the application of the
Controlled Substances Act to the possession of marijuana that was grown at home for
personal use.  The Court found it irrelevant that the individuals were not engaged in
commercial activity and did not buy, sell, or distribute any portion of the marijuana
they possessed.  The regulation was proper, the Court held, because “Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal
control would . . . affect price and market conditions.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.  The
failure to regulate such consumption would, in the aggregate, have a “substantial effect
on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.”  Ibid.
Raich reflected principles established more than half a century earlier in
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which upheld federal regulation of wheat
grown and consumed on a family farm as part of a program to control the volume and
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price of wheat moving in interstate commerce.  The Court sustained that exercise of
the commerce power even though the wheat at issue was not “sold or intended to be
sold,” id. at 119, even though the home consumption of wheat by any individual “may
be trivial by itself,” id. at 127, and even though the regulation “forc[ed] some farmers
into the market to buy what they could provide for themselves,” id. at 129.
b.  Plaintiffs acknowledge that they participate in the commercial market for
health care services.  They urge, however, that they do not participate in the insurance
market and have elected instead to “save for and privately manage their health care.” 
Pl. Br. 10.  As the district court observed, “Plaintiffs’ preference for paying for health
care needs out of pocket rather than purchasing insurance on the market is much like
the preference of the plaintiff farmer in Wickard for fulfilling his demand for wheat
by growing his own rather than by purchasing it.”  JA 171.   
As in Wickard, permitting plaintiffs to exercise their preference would
undermine the federal scheme for regulating the health care market in which they
participate.  Medical expenses can accumulate rapidly and without warning, and
plaintiffs, for example, do not suggest that they have the funds needed to cover the full
cost of a significant medical expense.  As noted, when people who decline to maintain
health insurance encounter unexpected expenses for which they cannot pay, those
costs are borne by other consumers who do purchase insurance.  This multi-billion
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dollar burden substantially affects the interstate health care services market.   
Contrary to plaintiffs’ premise, Congress was not required to consider the health
insurance market in isolation, divorced from its integral relationship to the overall
health care services market.  Congress did not establish the minimum coverage
provision as an end; rather it was imposed as a means toward proper financing of, and
expanded access to, health care services and of preventing market participants from
externalizing their costs.  Congress is regulating the conduct of participants in the
health care market, which is permissible even if the regulated participants are inactive
in the insurance market.  Thus, even assuming arguendo that the minimum coverage
provision could be thought to regulate inactivity, Congress is not regulating inactivity
“as such,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), but as an
aspect of its regulation of participation in the health care market.
Plaintiffs’ attempt to draw an impermeable line separating the purchase of
health care services from the maintenance of insurance coverage to pay for them
ignores the fundamental characteristic of health insurance — its function as the
principal means of payment for health care services in the United States.  Buying
insurance reflects a choice of one method of dealing with the cost of potential medical
expenses, in preference to other options.  Porat et al., Market Insurance versus Self
Insurance, 58 J. Risk & Ins. 657, 668 (1991).  Those who resort to those other options
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may “use informal risk-sharing arrangements, diversify assets, draw down savings, sell
assets, borrow, or go into debt to cover needed services.”  Ruger, supra, 100 Q.J. Med.
at 55.  Implicitly or otherwise, these actions commonly reflect economic assessments
of the relevant advantages of obtaining insurance versus other means of attempting to
pay for health care services, although those assessments often ignore or underestimate
the risks.  Pauly, Risks and Benefits in Health Care: The View From Economics, 26
Health Affairs 653, 658 (2007).
One way or another, those who participate in the health care market must
determine whether and how they will pay for the services they receive.  “Regardless
of whether one relies on an insurance policy, one’s savings, or the backstop of free or
reduced-cost emergency room services, one has made a choice regarding the method
of payment for the health care services one expects to receive.”  JA 170.  “As
Congress found, the total incidence of these economic decisions has a substantial
impact on the national market for health care by collectively shifting billions of dollars
on to other market participants and driving up the prices of insurance policies.” 
JA 170-71.
c.  Plaintiffs are thus quite wrong to analyze the constitutionality of the
minimum coverage provision through the lens of  “inactivity,” rather than by reference
to “broad principles of economic practicality,”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 571 (Kennedy, J.,
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concurring).  The Supreme Court has long held that “questions of the power of
Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula” without regard to “the
actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce.”  Wickard, 317
U.S. at 120; see also Darby, 312 U.S. at 118, 124 (referring to “practica[l]
impossibility” of targeting only interstate shipments and employers and holding that
Congress may “resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are
appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end”); Swift Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (“[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical legal
conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business.”); cf. Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962) (Congress in the Clayton Act
“prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of the relevant market”). 
Thus, federal statutes address practical economic circumstances, and may be
triggered even when individuals have not engaged in affirmative “activity” in the
narrow sense used by plaintiffs.  For example, under the Superfund Act, a property
owner may be subject to a remediation order whether or not he has engaged in
interstate commerce and without any showing that he caused the contamination.  42
U.S.C. § 9607(a).  Even a former property owner may be subject to a remediation
order if he permitted hazardous waste to leak on his property “without any active
human participation.”  Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837,
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845 (4th Cir. 1992).  The property owner’s characterization of his own behavior as
“passive” is irrelevant; otherwise, “an owner could insulate himself from liability by
virtue of his passivity,” defeating the remedial purposes of the Superfund Act.  Ibid. 
Similarly, federal laws regulating child pornography are triggered even when an
individual comes into possession of child pornography innocently, without having
taken any active measures.  Such an individual is required to take reasonable steps to
destroy the visual depictions or report the matter to law enforcement officials. 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(c).  See also Second Militia Act of 1792, ch.38, § 1, 1 Stat. 264, 265
(requiring all free men to obtain firearms, ammunition, and other equipment); Nortz
v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935) (sustaining requirement that persons
holding gold bullion, coin, or certificates exchange them for paper currency).
4. The Affordable Care Act regulates interstate activity making
national regulation particularly appropriate, and bears no
resemblance to the statutes held invalid in Lopez and Morrison.
a.  Plaintiffs’ attempt to analogize the minimum coverage provision to the
statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison echoes the arguments that the Supreme Court
rejected in Raich.  “In their myopic focus” on Lopez and Morrison, plaintiffs
“overlook the larger context of modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved
by those cases.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 23.
The statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison were stand-alone measures that
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involved no economic regulation.  In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down a ban on
possession of handguns in school zones because the ban was related to economic
activity only insofar as the presence of guns near schools might impair learning, which
in turn might ultimately undermine economic productivity.  Similarly, in Morrison, the
Court invalidated a tort cause of action established by the Violence Against Women
Act, explaining that it would require a chain of speculative assumptions to connect
gender-motivated violence with interstate commerce.  Neither of these measures
played any role in broader regulation of economic activity, and the “noneconomic,
criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central” to the decisions.  Morrison, 529
U.S. at 610; see also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 607 (2004).
The minimum coverage provision, in contrast, concerns intrinsically economic
activity by requiring health insurance as the means of payment for services in the
interstate health market.  It is not a stand-alone measure.  It is part of a broad economic
regulation of health care financing in the massive interstate health care market, and it
is essential to the Act’s regulation of underwriting practices in the insurance industry. 
It is difficult to conceive of legislation more clearly economic than the Act’s
regulation of the means of payment for health care services and the requirements
placed on insurers, employers, and individuals made insurable by the Act.  Far from
the chain of attenuated reasoning required in Lopez and Morrison to identify any
43
Case: 10-2347     Document: 34      Date Filed: 02/18/2011      Page: 56
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the link to interstate commerce in this case
is direct and compelling.
b.  Plaintiffs disregard the concern that animated Lopez and Morrison, which
was to avoid a view of economic causation so broad that it would “obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce.” 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).  Plaintiffs do not and
could not contend that the Affordable Care Act intrudes into an area of regulation that
is reserved to the states, or that the problems besetting our health care system can be
solved comprehensively on a state-driven basis.  “Affordable health care is a national
problem that demands a national solution.”  Rosenbaum, Can States Pick Up the
Health Reform Torch?, 362 New England J. Med. e29, at *3 (2010). 
The modern health care system is interdependent and operates across state
boundaries.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B).  Most health insurance is sold by national
or regional companies that operate interstate, and it covers costs for medical supplies,
drugs, and equipment shipped in interstate commerce.  Ibid.  Likewise, providers and
insurers are joined in national networks, and consumers cross state lines to obtain
health care services.  “Hospitals are regularly engaged in interstate commerce,
performing services for out-of-state patients and generating revenues from out-of-state
sources.”  Freilich, 313 F.3d at 213.  
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These phenomena have been amplified by modern transportation, which, the
Supreme Court acknowledged, has expanded the contours of Congress’s commerce
power.  See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964).  Given
the ease of travel, illnesses can spread rapidly and individuals can suddenly need
health care services far from home.   In some cases, consumers travel to obtain4
services not readily available in their own state.  For example, this Court noted in
Hoffman, 126 F.3d at 587, “that many women travel across state lines to obtain
reproductive health care, that facilities providing these services retain staff in an
interstate employment market and utilize supplies obtained through interstate
commerce.”  Similarly, residents of southwestern Pennsylvania make more than 1500
emergency room visits to a teaching hospital in West Virginia.  See Amicus Br. of the
Governors of Washington, Colorado, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, State of Florida
v. HHS, No. 3:10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla.), at 9 (noting also that a medical center in Seattle
is the only Level 1 trauma center for the four-state region of Washington, Alaska,
Montana, and Idaho).
Prior to the Affordable Care Act, this mobility created potential disincentives
 Congress also understood that interstate mobility itself created the conditions4
for the spread of disease.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-299(I) at 744 (2009).
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for individual states to adopt comprehensive reform of health insurance.   A state5
might reasonably have resisted providing more generous benefits or broader coverage
than its neighboring states out of concern that it would become “a bait to the needy
and dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose.” 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937).  In addition, a state considering
reforming discriminatory insurance practices might have worried that insurers –
mostly regional or national companies, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B) – would respond
to such regulations “simply by pulling up stakes” (particularly if the state’s reforms
lacked a minimum coverage provision).  Rosenbaum, supra, at e29; see p. 30, supra
(explaining that insurers withdrew from Maine in the absence of a minimum coverage
requirement).   This circumstance contrasts sharply with the situations in Lopez and
Morrison, which the Court found involved traditional subjects of state criminal law
enforcement focused on local actors.
Moreover, regulation of health care and health care insurance implicates
mobility between jobs and among states, considerations absent in Lopez and Morrison. 
Health insurance is very often an element of employees’ compensation.  If employees
See 156 Cong. Rec. 1824, 1835 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. McGovern)5
(“We have already taken important steps in Massachusetts to deal with the health care
issue. ... [And in light of the Affordable Care Act], we will no longer be forced to
subsidize through higher premiums and higher Medicare and Medicaid costs the
uncompensated care of people in other States who do not have health insurance.”). 
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put their insurance at risk when they change jobs, they may be “reluctant to switch
jobs in the first place (a phenomenon known as ‘job lock’).”  CBO, Key Issues at 8. 
As Congress understood, the prospect of losing employee insurance benefits may
obstruct interstate mobility, which the Constitution generally, and the commerce
power specifically, were designed to prevent.  Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 253
(noting the “uncertainty stemming from racial discrimination had the effect of
discouraging travel”).
Given these realities, it was more than rational for Congress to address the
challenges of a state-driven approach to health care by enacting national reforms.  See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (Congress
acted within its “traditional role ... under the Commerce Clause” in finding that
national coal mining standards were necessary because states might limit conservation
efforts in response to interstate competition among cost sellers); Darby, 312 U.S. at
122-23; Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
This Court has repeatedly held that Congress can regulate matters that relate to 
the cross-border challenges associated with health care and other markets.  For
example, because “[r]eports concerning [physician] peer review proceedings are
routinely distributed across state lines and affect doctors’ employment opportunities
throughout the Nation,” there is “no doubt concerning the power of Congress to
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regulate a peer review process.”  Freilich, 313 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks omitted). 
Similarly, in upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, this Court
reasoned that although the obstruction of clinic entrances “is not itself commercial or
economic in nature, it is closely connected with, and has a direct and profound effect
on, the interstate commercial market in reproductive health care services.”  Hoffman,
126 F.3d at 588.   
Moreover, in Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), this Court upheld
a statute that barred the taking of a red wolf on private land, noting that “[f]armers and
ranchers take wolves mainly because they are concerned that the animals pose a risk
to commercially valuable livestock and crops,” and that red wolves generated tourism
and scientific research as well as trade.  Id. at 492.  The Court observed that, “[w]hile
a beleaguered species may not presently have the economic impact of a large
commercial enterprise, its eradication nonetheless would have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.”  Id. at 493.  See also Gould, 568 F.3d at 475 (“A complex
regulatory program ... can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a showing
that every single facet of the program is independently and directly related to a valid
congressional goal.  It is enough that the challenged provisions are an integral part of
the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole
satisfies this test.”) (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n. 17 (1981)).
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c.  Plaintiffs invoke federalism concerns, but their quarrel, at bottom, is not with
the assertion of federal commerce power, but with any government requirement that
they maintain health insurance coverage.  In plaintiffs’ view, “if the district court’s
view of the Commerce Clause were true, then Congress could force those who dislike
vegetables to purchase and consume them using the rationale that everyone has to eat,
and vegetables are more healthful than fast food.”  Pl. Br. 24.  This rhetoric has
nothing to do with interstate commerce or the federalism limitations in the
Constitution, which “deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights.” 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008).  
Insofar as the issue is “liberty,” it would not matter whether a state or federal
government undertook the regulation.  Plaintiffs would object – to take their own
example – if a state government tried to tell them what they could eat.  Such a claim,
however, would properly be analyzed under the Due Process Clause, see Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), but it is very different from
plaintiffs’ claim here.  Plaintiffs’ claim relates not to any right the Court has
recognized as fundamental, but rather to a purported right to consume health care
services without insurance and to pass overwhelming costs on to other market
participants.  Such challenges to economic regulation have had no legal support since
the Lochner era.  
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Plaintiffs’ analogy to a hypothetical requirement that every American “buy a
General Motors vehicle,” Pl. Br. 17, is also inapt and disregards every salient feature
of the minimum coverage provision.  Plaintiffs’ hypothetical statute is simply a
directive to support a corporation by buying its products.  The minimum coverage
provision, in contrast, requires non-exempted health care consumers to maintain
insurance coverage so that they will not add to the staggering burden of
uncompensated health care costs.  For plaintiffs’ automotive analogy even to begin to
make sense, it must assume a fictional world in which every individual (1) is
necessarily in the car market because he may develop a sudden, unforeseen need to
have an expensive car, and (2) is entitled to receive the car regardless of his ability to
pay.  Crucially, plaintiffs’ analogy would still fail, as a parallel statute would not
require the purchase of a car but rather the purchase of a financial product to finance
a car when the need for one arises. 
Although plaintiffs insist that the minimum coverage provision represents a
“threat[]” to the “liberty of all Americans,” it is undisputed that Congress could have
compelled workers to obtain health insurance from a single payer and to pay for that
coverage through a mandatory tax.  Cf. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-45.  Congress
instead established a minimum coverage requirement that provides consumers with
enhanced flexibility in purchasing policies in the private market, subject to a tax
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penalty for noncompliance.  Nothing in the Constitution prohibits Congress from
employing these means, and with respect to plaintiffs’ articulated concerns, the tax
penalty mechanism is, indeed, a more modest step.  
Plaintiffs’ rhetoric is particularly anomalous in light of Affordable Care Act
provisions that confer significant benefits on people, like plaintiffs, who are not
currently insured.  As discussed, the Act guarantees that people like plaintiffs are
insurable and protects them from the risk of being left destitute by catastrophic
medical expenses.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (62% of all personal
bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses).  Even apart from the other
rational bases for Congress’s choice of means, “[t]his benefit makes imposing the
minimum coverage provision appropriate.”  Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720
F. Supp. 2d 882, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2010), appeal pending, No. 10-2388 (6th Cir.).  
At the end of the day, evaluation of whether an action by Congress is necessary
and proper calls for a deferential examination of the legislation in question, its factual
context, and Congress’s reasons for acting.  The analysis cannot be driven by
hypothetical statutes that no legislature would ever adopt.  Congress’s commerce
power to enact minimum wage legislation, Darby, 312 U.S. 100, is not defeated
because, hypothetically, Congress could use that power to set a minimum wage of
$5,000 per hour.  As Chief Justice Marshall explained long ago, “[t]he wisdom and the
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discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for
example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them
from its abuse.  They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in
all representative governments.”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.  1, 197 (1824) (Marshall,
C.J.).  Justice Story likewise recognized that it is manifestly incorrect to suggest that
“because Congress had not hitherto used a particular means to execute any ... given
power, therefore it could not now do it.”  3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1132, at 39 (1833).  Such a rule would mean that
“if [C]ongress had never provided a ship for the navy, except by purchase, [it] could
not now authorize ships to be built for a navy”; that “[i]f [Congress] had not laid a tax
on certain goods, it could not now be done”; or that “[i]f [Congress] had never erected
a custom-house, or a court-house, [Congress] could not now do it.”  Ibid.  That “mode
of reasoning would be deemed by all persons wholly indefensible.”  Ibid.
The minimum coverage provision is, in short, very plainly adapted to regulate
payments in the unique circumstances of the health care services market. 
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C. The employer responsibility provision is a valid exercise
of the commerce power.
The employer responsibility provision complements the minimum coverage
provision by imposing a tax penalty on large employers that fail to offer their full-time
employees adequate coverage, if at least one of their full-time employees receives a
tax credit to assist with the purchase of coverage through a health insurance exchange. 
Regulating employer provision of health care is hardly novel.  Congress has for
decades regulated the content and availability of group health insurance plans offered
by large employers under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., and other statutes.  In
enacting the employer responsibility provision, Congress found that “employers who
do not offer health insurance to their workers gain an unfair economic advantage
relative to those employers who do provide coverage, and millions of hard-working
Americans and their families are left without health insurance.”  H.R. Rep. No. 111-
443(II), at 985 (2010).  Congress noted that this state of affairs results in “a vicious
cycle because these uninsured workers turn to emergency rooms for health care which
in turn increases costs for employers and families with health insurance,” making it
more difficult for employers to provide coverage.  Id. at 985-86.
It has been settled at least since Darby and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), that the commerce power authorizes the regulation of wages,
hours, and other terms of employment.  JA 173.  In attempting to distinguish this
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longstanding precedent, plaintiffs assert that the employer responsibility provision
“mandates that private employers enter into agreements with other private businesses
to provide health insurance dictated by the government.”  Pl. Br. 25.  In reality, many
large employers self-insure.  CBO, Key Issues, at 6.  In any event, there is no support
for the proposition that a regulation of interstate commerce is suspect if compliance
requires a contract with a third party.
II.  The Minimum Coverage and Employer Responsibility Provisions Are Also
Independently Authorized by Congress’s Taxing Power. 
The district court correctly upheld the minimum coverage and employer
responsibility provisions as valid exercises of Congress’s commerce power, and thus
did not need to decide whether these provisions are also valid exercises of Congress’s
power to “lay and collect taxes.”  U.S. Const., art. I,§ 8, cl. 1.  If this Court were to
consider the issue, the provisions are also valid exercises of the taxing power, which
is “comprehensive,”  Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 581-82, and “plenary,” Murphy
v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 182-83 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
A tax “does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or
even definitely deters the activities taxed.”  United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44
(1950).  As long as a statute is “productive of some revenue,” Congress may exercise
its taxing powers irrespective of any “collateral inquiry as to the measure of the
regulatory effect of a tax.”  Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937); see
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also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974) (noting that the Court
has “abandoned” older “distinctions between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes”). 
In “passing on the constitutionality of a tax law,” a court is “concerned only with its
practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which
may be applied to it.”  Nelson, 312 U.S. at 363; see also United States v. Sotelo, 436
U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (funds owed by operation of Internal Revenue Code had
“essential character as taxes” despite statutory label as “penalties”).
The minimum coverage provision amends the Internal Revenue Code to provide
that a non-exempt individual who fails to maintain a minimum level of insurance shall
pay a monthly tax penalty for so long as he fails to do so.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.  The
practical operation of the provision is as a tax.  Individuals who are not required to file
income tax returns for a given year are not required to pay the penalty.  Id.
§ 5000A(e)(2).  The amount of any penalty is calculated in part by reference to
household income for federal tax purposes; it is reported on the individual’s federal
income tax return for the taxable year and is assessed and collected in the same
manner as certain other federal tax penalties.  Id. § 5000A(b)(2), (c)(1), (2), (g).  The
taxpayer’s responsibility for family members depends on their status as dependents
under the Internal Revenue Code.  Id. § 5000A(a), (b)(3).  And the Secretary of the
Treasury is empowered to enforce the penalty provision.  Id. § 5000A(g).  By creating
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a liability that must be reported on the taxpayer’s federal income tax return and
granting enforcement authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, the provision operates
as a taxing measure.  See In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir.
1996).
The employer responsibility provision amends the Internal Revenue Code to
impose a penalty on any applicable large employer that fails to offer its full-time
employees adequate coverage for any month, if at least one of the employer’s full-time
employees receives a tax credit to assist with the purchase of coverage through a
health insurance exchange in that month.  26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(a).  Like the penalty
component of the minimum coverage provision, the practical operation of this
provision is as a tax and, under the statute, it shall be assessed and collected in the
same manner as other assessable penalties imposed under the Internal Revenue Code. 
Id. § 4980H(d).
There is no dispute that these provisions will be “productive of some revenue.” 
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514.  The CBO estimated that the minimum coverage provision
will yield $4 billion each year, and the employer responsibility provision will produce 
$11 billion by 2019.  Letter from Elmendorf to Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, supra, table 4; see also Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1563(a)(1), 124 Stat.
119, 270 (finding that the Act “will reduce the Federal deficit”).    
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Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, Congress was not required to invoke its taxing
power explicitly or to label the payments “taxes.”  See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not
depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise”); Leckie, 99 F.3d at
576, 586 (“premium” on coal operators is an exercise of taxing power despite
Commerce Clause findings).  The Constitution itself uses four different terms to refer
to the concept of taxation: tax, impost, duties, and excises.  U.S. Const., art I, § 8, cl.
1.  Congress likewise used the terms “tax” and “assessable payment” interchangeably
in the employer responsibility provision.  26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(b)(1), (2).  In drafting
the Act, Congress repeatedly referred to the penalties as taxes, and during legislative
debates congressional leaders explicitly defended the provisions as an exercise of the
taxing power.  See 156 Cong. Rec. H1854, H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller); id.
at H1824, H1826 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter); 155 Cong. Rec. S13,751, S13,753
(Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy); id. at S13,558, S13,581-82 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen.
Baucus); see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-443(I), at 265 (2010).  
The taxing power may not be used to impose “punishment for an unlawful act.” 
United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931).  But the minimum coverage and
employer responsibility provisions do not impose “punishment.”  Neither applies
retrospectively; instead they impose month-to-month penalties for failures to obtain
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or provide adequate coverage, with liability ceasing when adequate coverage is
obtained or provided.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a)-(c); id. § 4980H(a), (b).  Penalty
amounts are subject to specified limits.  E.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(b)(2).  Under the
minimum coverage provision, the tax cannot exceed the cost of qualifying insurance, 
id. § 5000A(c).  (Indeed, the minimum coverage provision even has a “hardship”
exemption, id. § 5000A(e)(5), and bars criminal prosecution for failure to obtain
coverage, id. § 5000A(g)(2)(A).) 
In short, the minimum coverage and employer responsibility provisions are
taxes in both administration and effect.  They are enforced through the Internal
Revenue Service and — in conjunction with the rest of the Act — have been
determined by the CBO and Congress to reduce the budget deficit.  And any doubt as
to the meaning of the words in the Affordable Care Act should be construed in favor
of the statute’s constitutionality.  Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
Plaintiffs do not raise their tax apportionment claim on appeal, and the argument
is thus waived.  In any event, the district court correctly held that the Constitution’s
apportionment requirement does not apply to assessments that are enacted in aid of
valid Commerce Clause legislation.  JA 195.  Moreover, even if the provisions were
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analyzed solely as exercises of the taxing power, they do not impose “capitation” taxes
subject to the apportionment requirement.  A capitation tax is one imposed “simply,
without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.”  Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. 171, 175 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.); Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S.
433, 444-46 (1868) (adopting Justice Chase’s definition); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75
U.S. 533, 544 (1869).  The minimum coverage and employer responsibility provisions
do not impose flat taxes without regard to the taxpayer’s circumstances.  The employer
tax depends on whether a large employer offers adequate coverage to its full-time
employees.  26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H.  The penalty for a failure to maintain minimum
coverage is assessed on a monthly interval, based on how the taxpayer elects to pay
for health care services.  Id. § 5000A(a), (b)(1).  These provisions thus resemble other
federal taxes imposed for failures to make specified economic arrangements.6
 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4974 (tax on failure of retirement plans to distribute6
assets); id. § 4980B (tax on failure of group health plan to extend coverage to
beneficiary); id. § 4980E (tax on failure of employer to make comparable Archer
MSA contributions); id. § 4942 (tax on failure of private foundation to distribute
income).  
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III. The District Court Correctly Rejected Plaintiffs’ Religion-Based
Objections to the Minimum Coverage Provision.
Plaintiffs’ religion-based objections to the minimum coverage provision are
insubstantial for the reasons discussed by the district court.  See JA 177-90.  Plaintiffs
assert that the minimum coverage provision violates their free exercise rights by
requiring that they pay for procedures that “are antithetical to their religious beliefs.” 
Pl. Br. 48; see also Complaint ¶151.  The only such procedures identified in the
complaint are abortion procedures, and plaintiffs “fail to allege how any payments
required under the Act, whether fines, fees, taxes, or the cost of the policy, would be
used to fund abortion,” JA 186; see also JA 187 (dismissing RFRA claim because
plaintiffs’ “conclusory allegations” do not establish a substantial burden on their free
exercise).  To the extent plaintiffs argue that the Act is inconsistent with other facets
of their religious beliefs, the argument was waived.  JA 184 n.17.  
In any event, “[t]he Free Exercise Clause does not excuse individuals from
compliance with neutral laws of general applicability.”  JA 184.  The minimum
coverage provision is a law of general applicability because it does not “impose
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.”  Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993). 
Plaintiffs’ challenges to the exceptions to the minimum coverage provision are
equally unavailing.  The Supreme Court has “‘long recognized that the government
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may ... accommodate religious practices ... without violating the Establishment
Clause.’”  JA 178 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005)).  The
“health care sharing ministry” provision exempts members of § 501(c)(3)
organizations that have been in existence since 1999, that share a common set of
ethical or religious beliefs, that share medical expenses among their members in
accordance with those beliefs, and whose members retain membership even after they
develop a medical condition.  26 U.S.C.A, § 5000A(d)(2)(B).  The “religious
conscience exemption” incorporates a longstanding provision of the Internal Revenue
Code that applies to individuals who adhere to established tenets or teachings of
religious sects in existence since 1950 that are “conscientiously opposed to acceptance
of the benefits of any private or public insurance” (including Medicare, Medicaid, and
Social Security benefits).  Id. § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (incorporating the definition of
“religious sect” in 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1)).  Section 1402(g)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code was enacted as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965
“primarily because religious sects like the Old Order Amish provided for their own
needy, independent of public or private insurance programs.”  Varga v. United States,
467 F. Supp. 1113, 1117 (D. Md. 1979) (citing S. Rep. No. 89-404, at 116 (1965)),
aff'd, 618 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1980).
These provisions are neutral because they define eligibility based on
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characteristics that cut across denominations.  Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.  The courts of
appeals have uniformly upheld the § 1402(g) exemption because it “does not
discriminate among religions” but rather “accommodates, consistent with the goals of
the Social Security system, those who oppose Social Security on religious grounds.” 
Droz v. Comm’r, IRS, 48 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing cases).  
These exemptions easily withstand rational basis review.  As discussed, the
minimum coverage provision regulates the means of payment for services obtained in
the national health care market.  It was eminently rational for Congress to exempt
individuals who belong to groups with established records of providing for the
medical needs of their members without participating in the general health care
market.  JA 190.  Clearly, Congress was not also required to exempt individuals, like
plaintiffs, who instead participate in the interstate health care market.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
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